Privacy and security promise¶

Unison's home node is the primary authority for identity, context, relationships, memory, policy, credentials, audit records, capabilities, and keys. Every person has an independent key hierarchy; every shared context space has separate keys.

Unknown identity, purpose, audience, data class, context space, capability, or channel assurance must deny by default. Remote models and connectors receive only task-minimum information after an explicit disclosure decision. Sensitive actions need understandable confirmation and a cancellation or recovery path.

The tested implementation provides this policy boundary for synthetic and local integration tests. It denies unknown authority, requires a recorded local alternative check before remote inference, removes undisclosed fields and credentials, treats external content as untrusted, and uses exact, expiring, one-use confirmation for external or high-risk actions.

The backup boundary is provider-blind: AES-256-GCM envelope encryption occurs locally, manifests are encrypted and signed with Ed25519, and an independently held checkpoint detects rollback or forged state. Providers receive ciphertext and residual size/timing/account metadata, never decryption or recovery keys. Each adult controls an independent local recovery ceremony.

Honest limits¶

Unison remains in pre-release engineering. Automated tests cover governed private/shared context isolation, policy enforcement, provider-blind backup, and signed-update metadata verification. Supported-appliance validation, a backup subscription, TPM and hardware-backed update validation, and provider partnership guarantees remain ahead. When you enable a remote model or communication channel, that provider necessarily receives the minimized information required to perform your chosen function. Product documentation must identify that boundary clearly.